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Abstract This study examines the relationship between healthcare expenditure and
disposable income in the 50 US states over the period 1966–2009 using fractional
integration and cointegration techniques. The degree of integration and nonlinearity
of both series are found to vary considerably across states, while the fractional coin-
tegration analysis suggests that a long-run relationship exists between them in only
11 out of the 50 US states. The estimated long-run income elasticity of healthcare
expenditure suggests that health care is a luxury good in these states. By contrast, the
short-run elasticity obtained from the regressions in first differences is in the range
(0, 1) for most US states, which suggests that health care is a necessity good instead.
The implications of these results for health policy are also discussed.
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1 Introduction
According to the OECD Health Statistics (2014), in 2012 the USA spent 16.9% of its
GDP on health care, which is far higher than the OECD average of 9.3%, while on
a per capita basis it spent more than double the OECD average. Furthermore, from
1960, US healthcare expenditure has grown five times faster than GDP (from 7.1%
in the late sixties to 16.9% in 2012), and faster than in other OECD countries, and is
projected to grow at an average rate of 5.7% until 2023, 1.1% age points faster than the
expected average annual growth rate of GDP. However, its level and growth rate have
not been homogeneous across theUS states, as pointed out in different papers analysing
regional convergence in health spending (Wang2009; Panopoulou andPatenlidis 2012,
2013). For instance, in 2009 per capita personal healthcare spending in Massachusetts
($9,278) was almost twice than in Utah ($5,031).
The existing literature (starting with Kleiman 1974 and Newhouse 1977) has sug-
gested that disposable income, together with other demand and supply factors such
as medical technological progress or demographic trends, is one of the key drivers of
healthcare demand and therefore expenditure. However, the evidence on the existence
of a long-run relationship between income and healthcare expenditure, as well as the
income elasticity of healthcare expenditure and the relative importance of income as
one of its drivers, is mixed (see, for example, Acemoglu et al. 2013; Wang 2009;
Freeman 2012; Yavuz et al. 2013, among others). Whether health expenditure is a
luxury (income elasticity above 1) or a necessity (income elasticity below 1) good has
important policy implications: in the latter case, there is a strong argument for public
health policies and more public involvement (Freeman 2012).
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, we examine the long-memory
properties of healthcare expenditure and disposable income in 50 US states, allowing
for nonlinear deterministic trends in the form of Chebyshev polynomials. We take a
fractional integration approach that has advantages relative to the standard unit root
tests previously used, given the low power of the latter in the case of fractional and
near unit root processes (see for example, Diebold and Rudebusch 1991; Hasslers
and Wolters 1994; Lee and Schmidt 1996; and more recently, Ben Nasr et al. 2014).
However, it is well known that the presence of structural breaks in the data can lead to
spurious evidence of long memory (see for example, Cheung and Lai 1993; Diebold
and Inoue 2001; Ben Nasr et al. 2014). Given the existing evidence suggesting the
presence of structural breaks in both healthcare expenditure and personal income
(Freeman 2012) and the small sample size in our study (forty-four annual observations,
1966–2009), wemodel them including nonlinear time trends in the form of Chebyshev
polynomials; this approach is particularly appropriate at the annual frequency, for
which the breaks are likely to be smooth rather than sharp and sudden, and does not
require specifying a maximum number of breaks when testing for unit roots. Second,
we analyse the long-run relationship between income and healthcare expenditure using
both parametric (Gil-Alana 2003) and semiparametric (Robinson 1995a; Marinucci
and Robinson 2001) methods to test for fractional cointegration. To our knowledge,
this is the first study applying such methods for estimating the relationship between
these two variables in the US states. Third, we obtain estimates of the income elasticity
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with the aim of establishing whether health care should be considered a luxury or a
necessity good in each of the US states.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant
literature. Section 3describes the data and the empirical analysis. Section 4 summarises
the main findings and discusses their policy implications.
2 Literature review
The relationship between healthcare expenditure (HCE) and disposable income has
been extensively examined given its important policy implications. Estimates of
income elasticities range from close to zero and below one (Di Matteo 2003; Bal-
tagi and Moscone 2010; Freeman 2012) to higher than one (Ang 2010; Liu et al.
2010), depending on the choice of test statistics, whether or not deterministic trends
are included and/or structural breaks allowed for, the sample of countries, etc.
As for the long-run relationship between healthcare spending and income, a number
of papers have used time series approaches for various OECD countries (Blomqvist
and Carter 1997; Hansen and King 1998; Gerdtham and Löthgren 2000; MacDonald
andHopkins 2002; Dreger and Reimers 2005) or the US states (Wang and Rettenmaier
2007;Moscone andTosetti 2010; Freeman 2012).However, the results reported in such
studies may not be robust if the underlying data generating process (DGP) for the two
series is characterised by structural changes (Freeman 2012). Therefore, some more
recent papers allow for structural breaks when testing for cointegration (Jewel et al.
2003; Narayan 2006; Wang and Rettenmaier 2007, among others). On the whole, the
evidence is rather mixed. For example, Freeman (2012), using data for the US states
over the period 1966–2009, obtains income elasticity estimates belowone,whileWang
and Rettenmaier (2007) report elasticities higher than one over the period 1980–2000.
We revisit these issues using the more sophisticated econometric framework outlined
below.
3 Data and empirical analysis
We use annual data on healthcare expenditure (HCE) and disposable personal income
(DPI) from 1966 to 2009 for 50 US states. The sources for the former are the Cen-
ters for Medicare and Medicaid Services Health Expenditures by State of Residence.
They report total personal healthcare spending by state and by service, which are
expressed in per capita terms. Disposable income is obtained from the US Department
of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. Both HCE and DPI are deflated using
the Consumer Price Index.1
3.1 Univariate analysis
The first step is to estimate the fractional differencing parameter d in the following
setup:
1 We would like to thank Donald G. Freeman, Sam Houston State University, for providing the dataset.
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yt = β0 + β1t + xt , (1 − L)d xt = ut , t = 1,2, . . . (1)
where yt is the original time series; β0 and β1 are the unknown coefficients on the inter-
cept and the linear time trend, respectively; we consider the three standard assumptions
of no regressors [β0 = β1 = 0 a priori in (1)], an intercept (β0 unknown and β1 = 0 a
priori) and an intercept with a linear trend (β0 and β1 unknown). Specifically, we use
a Whittle estimator in the frequency domain as suggested in Dahlhaus (1989).
The results for real disposable personal income for each of the 50 US states are
reported in Table 1. In all but one case (Alaska), a linear time trend is required.
Concerning the estimates of d (and their corresponding 95% confidence bands), three
groups can be identified, including, respectively:
(a) the states with an order of integration significantly below 1, which indicates mean
reversion [Iowa (0.51); Nebraska (0.54), North Dakota (0.66) and South Dakota
(0.64)];
(b) those with a value of d significantly above 1 [Alaska (1.27), Hawaii (1.34) and
Maryland (1.29)]; and
(c) all the others (the remaining 43), where the unit root null, i.e., d = 1, cannot be
rejected.
Table 2 displays the results for the healthcare expenditure series. A linear time trend
is required in all cases and two groups can be identified, including, respectively:
(a) 20 states with d = 1, namely Alaska, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa,
Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico, Nebraska, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Washington andWyoming, and
(b) the remaining ones where the estimated value of d is significantly above 1.
Summary results for both variables are presented in Table 3. Evidence of mean rever-
sion (implying only transitory effects of shocks) is found for Iowa, Nebraska, North
Dakota and South Dakota in the case of disposable income.
However, these results could be biased owing to the presence of structural breaks.
Given the small number of observations (44), splitting the sample to test for them
is not feasible. We follow instead an alternative approach allowing for nonlineari-





θi PiT (t) + xt , t = 1, 2, . . . , (2)
with m indicating the order of the Chebyshev polynomial, θi denoting the Chebyshev
coefficients in time and xt following an I(d) process of the form as in Eq. (1).
The Chebyshev polynomials Pi,T (t) in (2) are defined as:
P0,T (t) = 1,
Pi,T (t) =
√
2 cos (iπ(t − 0.5)/T ) , t = 1, 2, . . . , T ; i = 1, 2, . . . (3)
(see Hamming (1973) and Smyth (1998) for a detailed description of these polyno-
mials). Bierens (1997) uses them in the context of unit root testing. According to
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Table 1 Estimates of d for each state: real disposable personal income
State No regressors An intercept A linear time trend
Alabama 0.91 (0.72, 1.18) 1.29 (0.82, 1.67) 1.20 (0.95, 1.60)
Alaska 0.93 (0.74, 1.19) 1.27 (1.06, 1.57) 1.25 (1.05, 1.57)
Arizona 0.92 (0.73, 1.19) 1.31 (0.98, 1.72) 1.26 (0.99, 1.70)
Arkansas 0.92 (0.73, 1.19) 1.00 (0.66, 1.43) 1.01 (0.78, 1.36)
California 0.91 (0.72, 1.19) 1.10 (0.84, 1.45) 1.07 (0.81, 1.44)
Colorado 0.90 (0.72, 1.18) 1.27 (0.96, 1.64) 1.22 (0.93, 1.65)
Connecticut 0.91 (0.72, 1.18) 1.01 (0.81, 1.39) 0.99 (0.73, 1.36)
Delaware 0.91 (0.71, 1.19) 1.16 (0.91, 1.49) 1.15 (0.86, 1.49)
Florida 0.92 (0.73, 1.19) 1.18 (0.70, 1.56) 1.13 (0.89, 1.50)
Georgia 0.91 (0.71, 1.19) 1.26 (0.92, 1.65) 1.21 (0.92, 1.62)
Hawaii 0.93 (0.74, 1.21) 1.39 (1.18, 1.67) 1.34 (1.15, 1.61)
Idaho 0.91 (0.72, 1.19) 1.07 (0.83, 1.37) 1.05 (0.84, 1.35)
Illinois 0.91 (0.71, 1.18) 0.90 (0.77, 1.25) 0.82 (0.48, 1.24)
Indiana 0.91 (0.71, 1.19) 0.89 (0.74, 1.26) 0.83 (0.52, 1.24)
Iowa 0.91 (0.72, 1.19) 0.69 (0.60, 0.85) 0.51 (0.29, 0.79)
Kansas 0.91 (0.72, 1.19) 0.96 (0.68, 1.32) 0.97 (0.76, 1.27)
Kentucky 0.92 (0.73, 1.21) 0.77 (0.65, 1.32) 0.91 (0.66, 1.23)
Louisiana 0.92 (0.73, 1.20) 1.04 (0.71, 1.44) 1.05 (0.85, 1.42)
Maine 0.91 (0.72, 1.19) 1.20 (0.85, 1.59) 1.16 (0.85, 1.55)
Maryland 0.92 (0.71, 1.19) 1.34 (1.04, 1.64) 1.29 (1.04, 1.59)
Massachusetts 0.91 (0.72, 1.19) 1.24 (0.96, 1.62) 1.25 (0.95, 1.64)
Michigan 0.90 (0.71, 1.19) 1.12 (0.82, 1.68) 1.11 (0.67, 1.68)
Minnesota 0.91 (0.72, 1.18) 0.84 (0.71, 1.23) 0.79 (0.48, 1.19)
Mississippi 0.92 (0.73, 1.19) 1.13 (0.67, 1.51) 1.09 (0.87, 1.40)
Missouri 0.91 (0.72, 1.19) 0.79 (0.69, 1.18) 0.67 (0.24, 1.16)
Montana 0.92 (0.72, 1.18) 0.93 (0.74, 1.20) 0.92 (0.75, 1.18)
New Hampshire 0.91 (0.71, 1.19) 1.02 (0.84, 1.36) 1.01 (0.75, 1.34)
New Jersey 0.91 (0.72, 1.18) 0.98 (0.78, 1.36) 0.97 (0.69, 1.32)
New Mexico 0.91 (0.72, 1.19) 1.08 (0.74, 1.46) 1.05 (0.84, 1.39)
New York 0.92 (0.72, 1.19) 1.10 (0.86, 1.46) 1.10 (0.82, 1.48)
Nebraska 0.91 (0.72, 1.19) 0.74 (0.65, 0.89) 0.54 (0.29, 0.84)
Nevada 0.90 (0.72, 1.17) 1.06 (0.76, 1.51) 1.03 (0.71, 1.50)
N. Carolina 0.91 (0.72, 1.19) 1.23 (0.89, 1.59) 1.17 (0.91, 1.55)
N. Dakota 0.92 (0.73, 1.19) 0.63 (0.47, 0.98) 0.66 (0.41, 0.98)
Ohio 0.91 (0.72, 1.20) 1.06 (0.77, 1.62) 1.03 (0.65, 1.59)
Oklahoma 0.91 (0.73, 1.18) 0.87 (0.67, 1.11) 0.89 (0.77, 1.08)
Oregon 0.91 (0.72, 1.19) 1.17 (0.85, 1.57) 1.14 (0.85, 1.56)
Pennsylvania 0.90 (0.72, 1.18) 1.03 (0.73, 1.51) 1.03 (0.70, 1.46)
Rhode Island 0.92 (0.72, 1.20) 1.13 (0.88, 1.61) 1.15 (0.83, 1.66)
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Table 1 continued
State No regressors An intercept A linear time trend
S. Carolina 0.92 (0.72, 1.19) 1.27 (0.82, 1.62) 1.20 (0.95, 1.54)
S. Dakota 0.91 (0.72, 1.19) 0.71 (0.59, 0.95) 0.64 (0.42, 0.94)
Tennessee 0.91 (0.72, 1.19) 1.18 (0.82, 1.63) 1.12 (0.83, 1.60)
Texas 0.91 (0.72, 1.19) 0.91 (0.71, 1.26) 0.93 (0.75, 1.19)
Utah 0.91 (0.72, 1.18) 1.29 (0.93, 1.86) 1.28 (0.88, 1.99)
Vermont 0.92 (0.72, 1.20) 0.89 (0.76, 1.28) 0.87 (0.58, 1.26)
Virginia 0.92 (0.72, 1.19) 1.35 (0.81, 1.76) 1.26 (0.94, 1.73)
W. Virginia 0.92 (0.72, 1.19) 1.06 (0.69, 1.45) 1.05 (0.82, 1.38)
Washington 0.91 (0.72, 1.19) 0.93 (0.80, 1.29) 0.81 (0.50, 1.30)
Wisconsin 0.92 (0.71, 1.20) 1.11 (0.81, 1.53) 1.08 (0.79, 1.48)
Wyoming 0.91 (0.73, 1.18) 1.15 (0.98, 1.45) 1.15 (0.97, 1.47)
We report in this table the estimates of d in the model given by Eq. (1) along with their 95% confidence
bands for the three cases of no deterministic terms (2nd column), with an intercept (3rd column) and with a
linear time trend (4th column). In bold are the significant coefficients according to the deterministic terms.
In parentheses, the 95% confidence band for the estimated values of d
Bierens (1997) and Tomasevic and Stanivuk (2009), it is possible to approximate
highly nonlinear trends with rather low-degree polynomials. If m = 0 the model con-
tains an intercept, if m = 1 it also includes a linear trend, and if m > 1 it becomes
nonlinear—the higher m is the less linear the approximated deterministic component
becomes.
The results with m = 3 are displayed in Table 4 (for disposable income) and in
Table 5 (for healthcare expenditure). For disposable income, the estimated value of d
is significantly below 1 in five states, namely Iowa, Nebraska, North Dakota, South
Dakota and Oklahoma, i.e., the same four as in Table 1 as well as Oklahoma. There
are also six cases when d is significantly higher than 1 (in Table 1, this happens in all
three cases). More importantly, there is some evidence of nonlinear behaviour in 29
out of the 50 states examined.
The corresponding results for healthcare expenditure are reported in Table 5. There
are six states for which the unit root null hypothesis cannot be rejected, namelyAlaska,
Idaho, Minnesota, Montana, South Dakota andWyoming. However, for the remaining
ones, the estimated value of d insignificantly higher than 1. Less evidence of nonlin-
earity is found than for disposable income: significant nonlinear coefficients are only
estimated in the cases of Alaska, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, South Dakota and
Wyoming. Table 6 summarises the nonlinear results for both variables.
3.2 Multivariate analysis
Next, we analyse the long-run relationship between disposable income and healthcare
expenditure. Table 7 reports the orders of integration of the two series for each state
and provides information on the homogeneity condition. We test for homogeneity in
123
The relationship between healthcare expenditure and disposable…
Table 2 Estimates of d for each state: healthcare expenditure
State No regressors An intercept A linear time trend
Alabama 0.94 (0.69, 1.24) 1.76 (1.43, 2.33) 1.49 (1.27, 1.94)
Alaska 0.91 (0.69, 1.21) 1.08 (0.89, 1.45) 1.09 (0.87, 1.42)
Arizona 0.96 (0.76, 1.24) 1.51 (0.69, 1.83) 1.39 (1.19, 1.65)
Arkansas 0.93 (0.69, 1.23) 1.48 (0.80, 1.83) 1.25 (1.08, 1.51)
California 0.96 (0.76, 1.24) 1.62 (1.35, 2.12) 1.45 (1.23, 1.87)
Colorado 0.93 (0.72, 1.22) 1.28 (0.77, 1.64) 1.16 (0.92, 1.47)
Connecticut 0.94 (0.71, 1.24) 1.54 (1.21, 1.95) 1.39 (1.15, 1.75)
Delaware 0.92 (0.70, 1.22) 1.43 (0.87, 1.85) 1.25 (0.98, 1.58)
Florida 0.95 (0.73, 1.25) 1.72 (1.44, 2.22) 1.45 (1.26, 1.80)
Georgia 0.95 (0.72, 1.25) 1.74 (1.47, 2.20) 1.51 (1.32, 1.83)
Hawaii 0.95 (0.74, 1.23) 0.90 (0.67, 1.76) 1.10 (0.96, 1.51)
Idaho 0.93 (0.70, 1.23) 1.12 (0.81, 1.61) 1.09 (0.80, 1.49)
Illinois 0.93 (0.72, 1.22) 1.53 (0.75, 2.01) 1.28 (1.06, 1.62)
Indiana 0.93 (0.69, 1.22) 1.58 (1.16, 2.14) 1.38 (1.08, 1.82)
Iowa 0.92 (0.69, 1.22) 1.22 (0.80, 1.76) 1.00 (0.82, 1.50)
Kansas 0.94 (0.72, 1.23) 1.41 (0.74, 1.86) 1.21 (0.93, 1.63)
Kentucky 0.92 (0.65, 1.24) 1.69 (1.32, 2.32) 1.42 (1.18, 1.82)
Louisiana 0.95 (0.72, 1.24) 1.63 (1.38, 2.03) 1.39 (1.21, 1.74)
Maine 0.93 (0.70, 1.23) 1.48 (0.88, 1.97) 1.29 (0.99, 1.68)
Maryland 0.95 (0.74, 1.24) 1.64 (1.37, 2.06) 1.42 (1.20, 1.75)
Massachusetts 0.94 (0.74, 1.23) 1.65 (1.28, 2.22) 1.47 (1.17, 1.94)
Michigan 0.94 (0.72, 1.22) 1.55 (1.24, 2.04) 1.28 (1.08, 1.62)
Minnesota 0.92 (0.59, 1.22) 1.12 (0.79, 1.56) 1.05 (0.85, 1.34)
Mississippi 0.93 (0.57, 1.24) 1.39 (0.79, 1.72) 1.19 (1.01, 1.46)
Missouri 0.95 (0.73, 1.24) 1.42 (0.69, 1.83) 1.21 (0.98, 1.54)
Montana 0.93 (0.71, 1.23) 0.89 (0.77, 1.61) 1.01 (0.71, 1.41)
New Hampshire 0.93 (0.69, 1.22) 1.44 (1.05, 1.88) 1.35 (1.09, 1.73)
New Jersey 0.92 (0.68, 1.22) 1.63 (1.36, 2.02) 1.49 (1.26, 1.82)
New Mexico 0.94 (0.71, 1.24) 0.89 (0.77, 1.63) 1.05 (0.77, 1.44)
New York 0.94 (0.72, 1.24) 1.79 (1.42, 2.44) 1.56 (1.28, 1.94)
Nebraska 0.93 (0.71, 1.22) 1.42 (0.78, 1.85) 1.22 (0.96, 1.59)
Nevada 0.96 (0.76, 1.24) 1.39 (1.15, 1.71) 1.27 (1.10, 1.51)
N. Carolina 0.93 (0.67, 1.24) 1.55 (1.24, 1.95) 1.36 (1.14, 1.66)
N. Dakota 0.95 (0.73, 1.25) 1.41 (1.04, 1.86) 1.25 (0.98, 1.67)
Ohio 0.92 (0.69, 1.23) 1.66 (1.30, 2.30) 1.38 (1.12, 1.89)
Oklahoma 0.95 (0.73, 1.24) 1.17 (0.72, 1.67) 1.08 (0.79, 1.43)
Oregon 0.95 (0.74, 1.24) 1.32 (0.84, 1.82) 1.16 (0.87, 1.54)
Pennsylvania 0.92 (0.69, 1.23) 1.58 (1.30, 1.98) 1.35 (1.15, 1.66)
Rhode Island 0.93 (0.71, 1.22) 1.35 (0.79, 1.77) 1.19 (0.88, 1.58)
S. Carolina 0.93 (0.66, 1.24) 1.61 (1.32, 1.94) 1.40 (1.19, 1.72)
123
G. M. Caporale et al.
Table 2 continued
State No regressors An intercept A linear time trend
S. Dakota 0.92 (0.69, 1.23) 0.85 (0.78, 1.71) 0.89 (0.62, 1.33)
Tennessee 0.92 (0.68, 1.22) 1.45 (1.21, 1.81) 1.26 (1.10, 1.49)
Texas 0.95 (0.73, 1.24) 1.57 (1.27, 1.93) 1.29 (1.10, 1.59)
Utah 0.93 (0.70, 1.23) 1.51 (1.03, 1.97) 1.33 (1.04, 1.76)
Vermont 0.92 (0.70, 1.22) 1.39 (1.06, 1.81) 1.36 (1.11, 1.74)
Virginia 0.95 (0.72, 1.24) 1.59 (1.32, 1.80) 1.33 (1.14, 1.64)
W. Virginia 0.93 (0.68, 1.24) 1.56 (1.22, 2.03) 1.33 (1.11, 1.62)
Washington 0.94 (0.73, 1.24) 1.44 (0.75, 1.89) 1.25 (0.91, 1.64)
Wisconsin 0.93 (0.73, 1.23) 1.44 (1.07, 1.93) 1.25 (1.02, 1.51)
Wyoming 0.92 (0.69, 1.21) 1.04 (0.93, 1.28) 1.06 (0.91, 1.32)
We report in this table the estimates of d in the model given by Eq. (1) along with their 95% confidence
bands for the three cases of no deterministic terms (2nd column), with an intercept (3rd column) and with a
linear time trend (4rd column). In bold are the significant coefficients according to the deterministic terms.
In parentheses, the 95% confidence band for the estimated values of d
Table 3 Grouping of the states according to the degrees of integration
d Disposable personal income HC expenditure
d < 1 Iowa, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota
d = 1 Alabama, Arizona Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, Nevada, North Caroline,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Caroline, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia,
Washington, Wisconsin, Wyoming
Alaska, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii,
Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maine,
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana,
New Mexico, Nebraska, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, Washington,
Wyoming





Mississippi, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, Nevada, North
Caroline, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
South Caroline, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West
Virginia, Wisconsin
d refers to the estimates of the fractional differencing parameter in Eq. (1)
the order of integration of the variables by using an adaptation of Robinson andYajima
(2002) statistic T̂xy to log-periodogram estimation (Robinson 1995b). The statistic is
the following:
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Table 4 Estimates of d based on a nonlinear model for disposable personal income
State Income θ0 θ1 θ2 θ3
Alabama 1.30 (1.05, 1.59) 4.443 (26.57) −0.222 (−2.09) −0.008 (−0.22) −0.032 (−1.42)
Alaska 0.98 (0.60, 1.43) 4.969 (39.22) −0.091 (−1.24) −0.041 (−1.10) −0.094 (−3.74)
Arizona 1.28 (0.97, 1.62) 4.561 (23.82) −0.172 (−1.42) 0.007 (0.17) −0.047 (−1.78)
Arkansas 1.05 (0.78, 1.40) 4.451 (39.24) −0.223 (−3.32) −0.011 (−0.37) −0.045 (−2.20)
California 0.96 (0.62, 1.35) 4.882 (86.48) −0.150 (−4.62) −0.021 (−0.12) −0.038 (−3.29)
Colorado 1.12 (0.84, 1.45) 4.778 (52.32) −0.226 (−4.10) 0.001 (0.04) −0.043 (−2.84)
Connecticut 1.05 (0.77, 1.38) 4.967 (48.86) −0.231 (−3.85) −0.014 (−0.50) −0.015 (−0.81)
Delaware 1.13 (0.85, 1.46) 4.801 (42.21) −0.176 (−2.56) −0.001 (−0.06) −0.009 (−0.48)
Florida 1.21 (0.94, 1.58) 4.633 (28.23) −0.194 (−1.91) −0.009 (−0.22) −0.031 (−1.29)
Georgia 1.24 (0.93, 1.57) 4.549 (27.95) −0.228 (−2.25) −0.005 (−0.14) −0.012 (−0.54)
Hawaii 1.41 (1.22, 1.60) 4.582 (18.51) −0.039 (−0.24) −0.002 (−0.05) −0.009 (−0.33)
Idaho 1.07 (0.87, 1.34) 4.524 (38.60) −0.170 (−2.44) −0.016 (−0.49) −0.031 (−1.70)
Illinois 0.87 (0.58, 1.22) 4.855 (96.16) −0.179 (−6.28) 0.002 (0.15) −0.020 (−1.77)
Indiana 0.83 (0.54, 1.22) 4.690 (83.49) −0.173 (−5.50) −0.001 (0.08) −0.015 (−1.13)
Iowa 0.42 (0.13, 0.77) 4.744 (226.69) −0.176 (−13.36) 0.009 (0.83) −0.038 (−4.10)
Kansas 0.98 (0.72, 1.30) 4.706 (59.23) −0.190 (−4.13) −0.007 (−0.30) −0.043 (−2.76)
Kentucky 0.99 (0.68, 1.33) 4.503 (54.89) −0.207 (−4.35) −0.008 (−0.34) −0.031 (−1.95)
Louisiana 0.98 (0.60, 1.39) 4.568 (67.51) −0.225 (−5.75) −0.002 (−0.10) −0.058 (−4.29)
Maine 1.23 (0.94, 1.59) 4.583 (30.09) −0.209 (−2.20) −0.001 (−0.03) −0.020 (−0.93)
Maryland 1.37 (1.14, 1.61) 4.733 (22.84) −0.185 (−1.39) −0.003 (−0.08) −0.029 (−1.11)
Massachusetts 1.28 (1.01, 1.57) 4.812 (27.01) −0.228 (−2.03) 0.007 (0.17) −0.011 (−0.46)
Michigan 1.02 (0.57, 1.56) 4.775 (48.39) −0.147 (−2.54) −0.001 (−0.04) −0.007 (−0.40)
Minnesota 0.83 (0.50, 1.20) 4.777 (77.52) −0.222 (−6.44) −0.02 (−0.09) −0.032 (−2.13)
Mississippi 1.19 (0.96, 1.54) 4.291 (28.27) −0.223 (−2.39) 0.005 (0.14) −0.039 (−1.67)
Missouri 0.76 (0.30, 1.21) 4.718 (115.75) −0.194 (−8.54) −0.004 (−0.28) −0.024 (−2.22)
Montana 0.79 (0.56, 1.08) 4.621 (84.05) −0.163 (−5.33) 0.013 (0.72) −0.056 (−4.03)
New Hampshire 0.95 (0.63, 1.30) 4.813 (61.62) −0.256 (−5.71) −0.018 (−0.78) −0.019 (−1.23)
New Jersey 1.07 (0.82, 1.38) 4.904 (51.03) −0.219 (−3.85) −0.004 (−0.18) −0.014 (−0.86)
New Mexico 0.97 (0.66, 1.35) 4.552 (75.44) −0.194 (−5.56) −0.006 (−0.37) −0.050 (−4.11)
New York 1.16 (0.92, 1.48) 4.845 (37.18) −0.177 (−2.22) 0.028 (0.08) −0.005 (−0.23)
Nebraska 0.58 (0.29, 0.90) 4.775 (148.82) −0.206 (−11.30) 0.004 (0.29) −0.034 (−3.06)
Nevada 1.05 (0.74, 1.44) 4.795 (45.62) −0.139 (−2.24) 0.006 (0.22) −0.025 (−1.32)
N. Carolina 1.22 (0.94, 1.61) 4.521 (29.27) −0.231 (−2.41) −0.011 (−0.31) −0.01 (−0.47)
N. Dakota 0.56 (0.22, 0.95) 4.677 (63.66) −0.202 (−4.76) 0.017 (0.53) −0.074 (−2.79)
Ohio 1.05 (0.66, 1.56) 4.723 (57.14) −0.162 (−3.31) −0.005 (−0.23) −0.016 (−1.08)
Oklahoma 0.39 (−0.01, 0.77) 4.663 (390.38) −0.186 (−24.10) −0.01 (−1.65) −0.067 (−11.77)
Oregon 1.16 (0.88, 1.52) 4.669 (38.73) −0.172 (−2.34) 0.006 (0.21) −0.027(−1.66)
Pennsylvania 1.16 (0.86, 1.52) 4.705 (46.07) −0.184 (−2.96) −0.002 (−0.07) −0.021 (−1.30)
Rhode Island 1.19 (0.88, 1.55) 4.738 (38.36) −0.193 (−2.53) 0.005 (0.16) −0.012 (−0.64)
S. Carolina 1.30 (1.05, 1.57) 4.415 (25.85) −0.215 (−1.98) −0.003 (−0.09) −0.020 (−0.89)
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Table 4 continued
State Income θ0 θ1 θ2 θ3
S. Dakota 0.61 (0.32, 0.94) 4.673 (84.04) −0.234 (−7.42) 0.017 (0.76) −0.052 (−2.80)
Tennessee 1.17 (0.87, 1.60) 4.548 (33.56) −0.237 (−2.86) 0.01 (−0.31) −0.020 (−0.94)
Texas 0.74 (0.39, 1.09) 4.705 (140.63) −0.215 (−11.58) −0.016 (−1.32) −0.052 (−5.70)
Utah 1.13 (0.71, 1.62) 4.576 (47.19) −0.179 (−3.05) 0.014 (0.55) −0.043 (−2.69)
Vermont 0.98 (0.65, 1.32) 4.5547 (59.88) −0.231 (−5.12) 0.009 (0.38) −0.024 (−1.68)
Virginia 1.34 (1.03, 1.58) 4.664 (27.16) −0.218 (−1.99) −0.012 (−0.31) −0.035 (−1.68)
W. Virginia 1.11 (0.85, 1.44) 4.462 (42.76) −0.185 (−2.94) 0.004 (0.02) −0.035 (−1.99)
Washington 0.73 (0.30, 1.22) 4.853 (168.69) −0.199 (−12.42) 0.008 (0.008) −0.032 (−4.01)
Wisconsin 1.07 (0.78, 1.46) 4.698 (57.20) −0.184 (−3.76) 0.004 (0.19) −0.031 (−2.11)
Wyoming 0.80 (0.53, 1.16) 4.782 (82.06) −0.200 (−6.17) 0.023 (1.14) −0.096 (−6.53)
The 2nd column refers to the estimates of d (and their associated 95% confidence intervals in the model given
by Eq. (2) with I(d) xt . The values in columns 3, 4, 5 and 6 refers to the Chebyshev coefficients in Eq. (2) (t










1 − Ĝxy/(Ĝxx Ĝ yy
))1/2 + h(n)
(4)
where m is a bandwidth parameter, dx and dy are the orders of integration of each of
the series, I (λ j ) is the cross-periodogram in the bivariate representation of the series,








−1 I (λ j )̂(λ j )−1∗
]
,
̂(λ j ) = diag
{
eiπ d̂x/2λ−d̂x , eiπ d̂y/2λ−d̂y
}
,
with a standard normal limit distribution (seeGil-Alana andHualde 2009, for evidence
on the finite sample performance of this procedure). This is satisfied in all cases with
the exception of Iowa, Nebraska and North Dakota, where the orders of integration
for disposable income (0.51, 0.54 and 0.66, respectively) are much lower than for
healthcare expenditure (1.00, 1.22 and 1.25, respectively). Therefore, cointegration
between the two series can be ruled out in these three cases. For the remaining states,
we test for cointegration using a two-step method, similar in spirit to the one proposed
by Engle and Granger (1987): first, we regress healthcare expenditure on disposable
income, and then, in the second step, we test the order of integration of the estimated
residuals. This approach is followed, for instance, in Gil-Alana (2003). Specifically,
we first run the regression:
log(HEALTH)t = β0 +β1 log(INCOME)t + xt , t = 1,2, . . . (5)
and then the fractional differencing parameter d is estimated for the residuals from
the above equation.
123
The relationship between healthcare expenditure and disposable…
Table 5 Estimates of d based on a nonlinear model for healthcare expenditure
State Health θ0 θ1 θ2 θ3
Alabama 1.68 (1.40, 1.74) 1.907 (3.23) −0.277 (−0.70) −0.072 (−0.65) 0.060 (−1.08)
Alaska 0.82 (0.53, 1.27) 2.836 (42.63) −0.523 (−14.04) −0.005 (−0.23) −0.098 (−5.99)
Arizona 1.49 (1.29, 1.71) 2.109 (5.49) −0.195 (−0.77) −0.048 (−0.61) −0.020 (−0.48)
Arkansas 1.45 (1.22, 1.73) 2.097 (6.65) −0.390 (−1.89) −0.048 (−0.74) −0.025 (−0.70)
California 1.56 (1.32, 1.72) 2.202 (5.41) −0.068 (−0.25) −0.054 (−0.68) −0.034 (−0.81)
Colorado 1.35 (1.12, 1.57) 2.429 (11.36) −0.300 (−2.19) −0.021 (−0.45) −0.019 (−0.71)
Connecticut 1.54 (1.29, 1.70) 2.276 (5.27) −0.236 (−0.83) −0.026 (−0.30) 0.023 (0.50)
Delaware 1.47 (1.24, 1.71) 2.361 (7.49) −0.352 (−1.71) −0.014 (−0.23) −0.009 (−0.25)
Florida 1.61 (1.38, 1.73) 2.061 (4.43) −0.161 (−0.52) −0.080 (−0.90) 0.002 (0.05)
Georgia 1.61 (1.40, 1.74) 1.933 (3.96) −0.229 (−0.70) −0.070 (−0.75) 0.002 (0.05)
Hawaii 1.38 (1.14, 1.67) 2.287 (7.45) −0.277 (−1.40) −0.039 (−0.59) −0.010 (−0.27)
Idaho 1.24 (0.96, 1.57) 2.164 (7.88) −0.477 (−2.61) 0.016 (0.25) −0.020 (−0.51)
Illinois 1.51 (1.29, 1.68) 2.305 (7.33) −0.262 (−1.26) −0.029 (−0.46) −0.018 (−0.53)
Indiana 1.56 (1.28, 1.70) 2.144 (5.08) −0.282 (−1.00) −0.024 (−0.29) −0.011 (−0.24)
Iowa 1.31 (1.02, 1.64) 2.416 (10.21) −0.415 (−2.76) −0.005 (−0.10) −0.028 (−0.90)
Kansas 1.45 (1.17, 1.76) 2.266 (6.75) −0.326 (−1.67) −0.010 (−0.15) −0.023 (−0.60)
Kentucky 1.57 (1.31, 1.72) 2.031 (5.47) −0.336 (−1.37) −0.023 (−0.32) 0.001 (0.02)
Louisiana 1.57 (1.37, 1.70) 2.01 (4.82) −0.264 (−0.95) −0.063 (−0.77) −0.015 (−0.34)
Maine 1.54 (1.26, 1.72) 2.141 (5.25) −0.361 (−1.34) 0.025 (0.30) −0.024 (−0.55)
Maryland 1.57 (1.40, 1.73) 2.095 (5.05) −0.207 (−0.75) −0.034 (−0.42) −0.021 (−0.50)
Massachusetts 1.59 (1.38, 1.72) 2.307 (5.10) −0.185 (−0.61) −0.031 (−0.36) 0.0008 (−0.01)
Michigan 1.48 (1.25, 1.70) 2.319 (8.12) −0.255 (−1.36) −0.049 (−0.85) −0.025 (−0.79)
Minnesota 1.13 (0.81, 1.47) 2.661 (2.45) −0.463 (−5.88) −0.031 (−0.94) −0.053 (−2.51)
Mississippi 1.39 (1.16, 1.68) 2.041 (6.09) −0.492 (−2.27) −0.031 (−0.43) −0.048 (−1.18)
Missouri 1.38 (1.08, 1.70) 2.369 (8.43) −0.328 (−1.81) −0.045 (−0.75) −0.041 (−1.20)
Montana 1.26 (0.98, 1.57) 2.335 (9.99) −0.437 (−2.98) −0.003 (−0.05) −0.035 (−1.06)
New Hampshire 1.48 (1.29, 1.71) 2.234 (6.81) −0.337 (−1.76) −0.012 (−0.18) 0.006 (−0.02)
New Jersey 1.56 (1.35, 1.72) 2.231 (5.54) −0.318 (−1.19) −0.035 (−0.44) −0.012 (−0.28)
New Mexico 1.32 (1.10, 1.57) 2.187 (8.27) −0.412 (−2.45) −0.019 (−0.33) −0.019 (−0.55)
New York 1.61 (1.48, 1.72) 2.244 (5.25) −0.132 (−0.46) −0.014 (−0.17) 0.023 (0.53)
Nebraska 1.42 (1.15, 1.72) 2.359 (8.80) −0.379 (−2.18) −0.013 (−0.23) −0.055 (−1.72)
Nevada 1.29 (1.01, 1.57) 2.381 (9.57) −0.311 (−1.98) −0.049 (−0.87) −0.072 (−2.14)
N. Carolina 1.55 (1.29, 1.71) 1.968 (4.50) −0.363 (−1.25) −0.015 (−0.17) −0.005 (−0.11)
N. Dakota 1.38 (1.04, 1.70) 2.393 (6.67) −0.351 (−1.72) −0.04 (−0.51) −0.047 (−1.07)
Ohio 1.56 (1.24, 1.70) 2.286 (6.04) −0.282 (−1.12) −0.053 (−0.71) −0.030 (−0.76)
Oklahoma 1.36 (1.13, 1.68) 2.211 (7.64) −0.342 (−1.84) −0.001 (−0.16) −0.022 (−0.61)
Oregon 1.39 (1.11, 1.71) 2.267 (7.82) −0.305 (−1.86) −0.005 (−0.08) −0.040 (−1.12)
Pennsylvania 1.49 (1.26, 1.74) 2.384 (8.00) −0.347 (−1.77) −0.055 (−0.91) −0.011 (−0.33)
Rhode Island 1.41 (1.18, 1.72) 2.499 (8.82) −0.358 (−1.95) −0.010 (−0.17) −0.027 (−0.82)
S. Carolina 1.57 (1.34, 1.72) 1.871 (4.16) −0.377 (−1.26) −0.018 (−0.21) −0.006 (−0.14)
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Table 5 continued
State Health θ0 θ1 θ2 θ3
S. Dakota 1.24 (0.91, 1.57) 2.428 (13.14) −0.466 (−4.04) −0.010 (−0.23) −0.038 (−1.65)
Tennessee 1.35 (1.09, 1.63) 2.367 (9.41) −0.466 (−4.04) −0.060 (−1.08) −0.032 (−1.01)
Texas 1.52 (1.28, 1.71) 2.087 (6.27) −0.447 (−2.78) −0.032 (−0.49) −0.021 (−0.58)
Utah 1.48 (1.21, 1.70) 2.074 (6.36) −0.246 (−1.12) −0.027 (−0.41) −0.026 (−0.72)
Vermont 1.44 (1.15, 1.74) 2.265 (6.83) −0.399 (−1.85) 0.064 (−0.93) −0.013 (−0.34)
Virginia 1.56 (1.31, 1.75) 2.003 (5.14) −0.263 (−1.02) −0.055 (−0.72) −0.032 (−0.80)
W. Virginia 1.59 (1.31, 1.74) 2.009 (4.39) −0.301 (−0.99) −0.032 (−0.36) 0.011 (−0.23)
Washington 1.47 (1.23, 1.71) 2.257 (6.98) −0.228 (−1.08) −0.026 (−0.39) −0.013 (−0.36)
Wisconsin 1.47 (1.23, 1.72) 2.292 (7.15) −0.350 (−1.68) 0.0001 (0.01) −0.040 (−1.11)
Wyoming 0.90 (0.21, 1.28) 2.494 (23.09) −0.524 (−10.40) 0.064 (2.27) −0.009 (−0.46)
The 2nd column refers to the estimates of d (and their associated 95% confidence intervals in the model given
by Eq. (2) with I(d) xt . The values in columns 3, 4, 5 and 6 refers to the Chebyshev coefficients in Eq. (2) (t
values in parenthesis). In bold are significant coefficients at the 5% level
Table 6 Summary of the nonlinear results
Disposable personal income Healthcare expenditure
Linear Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York. Nevada, North
Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania,





Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Utah,
Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia,
Washington, Wisconsin
Nonlinear Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Idaho,
Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, New Mexico,
Nebraska, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota,




Nevada, South Dakota, Wyoming
Table 8 reports the estimates of β1 and those of d based on both parametric and
semiparametric methods, in the latter case using three different bandwidth param-
eters, T 0.4, T 0.5 and T 0.4. The β1 coefficients are all statistically significant, and
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Table 7 Estimates of d for each state and homogeneity in the value of d
State DPI HCE Homogeneity
Alabama 1.20 (0.95, 1.60) 1.49 (1.27, 1.94) γ
Alaska 1.27 (1.06, 1.57) 1.09 (0.87, 1.42) γ
Arizona 1.26 (0.99, 1.70) 1.39 (1.19, 1.65) γ
Arkansas 1.01 (0.78, 1.36) 1.25 (1.08, 1.51) γ
California 1.07 (0.81, 1.44) 1.45 (1.23, 1.87) γ
Colorado 1.22 (0.93, 1.65) 1.16 (0.92, 1.47) γ
Connecticut 0.99 (0.73, 1.36) 1.39 (1.15, 1.75) γ
Delaware 1.15 (0.86, 1.49) 1.25 (0.98, 1.58) γ
Florida 1.13 (0.89, 1.50) 1.45 (1.26, 1.80) γ
Georgia 1.21 (0.92, 1.62) 1.51 (1.32, 1.83) γ
Hawaii 1.34 (1.15, 1.61) 1.10 (0.96, 1.51) γ
Idaho 1.05 (0.84, 1.35) 1.09 (0.80, 1.49) γ
Illinois 0.82 (0.48, 1.24) 1.28 (1.06, 1.62) γ
Indiana 0.83 (0.52, 1.24) 1.38 (1.08, 1.82) γ
Iowa 0.51 (0.29, 0.79) 1.00 (0.82, 1.50) NO HOMOG.
Kansas 0.97 (0.76, 1.27) 1.21 (0.93, 1.63) γ
Kentucky 0.91 (0.66, 1.23) 1.42 (1.18, 1.82) γ
Louisiana 1.05 (0.85, 1.42) 1.39 (1.21, 1.74) γ
Maine 1.16 (0.85, 1.55) 1.29 (0.99, 1.68) γ
Maryland 1.29 (1.04, 1.59) 1.42 (1.20, 1.75) γ
Massachusetts 1.25 (0.95, 1.64) 1.47 (1.17, 1.94) γ
Michigan 1.11 (0.67, 1.68) 1.28 (1.08, 1.62) γ
Minnesota 0.79 (0.48, 1.19) 1.05 (0.85, 1.34) γ
Mississippi 1.09 (0.87, 1.40) 1.19 (1.01, 1.46) γ
Missouri 0.67 (0.24, 1.16) 1.21 (0.98, 1.54) γ
Montana 0.92 (0.75, 1.18) 1.01 (0.71, 1.41) γ
New Hampshire 1.01 (0.75, 1.34) 1.35 (1.09, 1.73) γ
New Jersey 0.97 (0.69, 1.32) 1.49 (1.26, 1.82) γ
New Mexico 1.05 (0.84, 1.39) 1.05 (0.77, 1.44) γ
New York 1.10 (0.82, 1.48) 1.56 (1.28, 1.94) γ
Nebraska 0.54 (0.29, 0.84) 1.22 (0.96, 1.59) NO HOMOG.
Nevada 1.03 (0.71, 1.50) 1.27 (1.10, 1.51) γ
N. Carolina 1.17 (0.91, 1.55) 1.36 (1.14, 1.66) γ
N. Dakota 0.66 (0.41, 0.97) 1.25 (0.98, 1.67) NO HOMOG.
Ohio 1.03 (0.65, 1.59) 1.38 (1.12, 1.89) γ
Oklahoma 0.89 (0.77, 1.08) 1.08 (0.79, 1.43) γ
Oregon 1.14 (0.85, 1.56) 1.16 (0.87, 1.54) γ
Pennsylvania 1.03 (0.70, 1.46) 1.35 (1.15, 1.66) γ
Rhode Island 1.15 (0.83, 1.66) 1.19 (0.88, 1.58) γ
S. Carolina 1.20 (0.95, 1.54) 1.40 (1.19, 1.72) γ
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Table 7 continued
State DPI HCE Homogeneity
S. Dakota 0.64 (0.42, 0.94) 0.89 (0.62, 1.33) γ
Tennessee 1.12 (0.83, 1.60) 1.26 (1.10, 1.49) γ
Texas 0.93 (0.75, 1.19) 1.29 (1.10, 1.59) γ
Utah 1.28 (0.88, 1.99) 1.33 (1.04, 1.76) γ
Vermont 0.87 (0.58, 1.26) 1.36 (1.11, 1.74) γ
Virginia 1.26 (0.94, 1.73) 1.33 (1.14, 1.64) γ
W. Virginia 1.05 (0.82, 1.38) 1.33 (1.11, 1.62) γ
Washington 0.81 (0.50, 1.30) 1.25 (0.91, 1.64) γ
Wisconsin 1.08 (0.79, 1.48) 1.25 (1.02, 1.51) γ
Wyoming 1.15 (0.97, 1.47) 1.06 (0.91, 1.32) γ
Columns 2 and 3 display the estimated values of d (and 95% confidence intervals) for each series obtained
from Tables 1 and 2 above. Column 4 indicates if the homogeneity condition is satisfied or not
range between 1.699 (in the case of Colorado) and 2.985 (Ohio); as for the estimates
of d, in the parametric case they are all within the I(1) interval, and there are only
two states with estimates significantly below 1 (Missouri, 0.63, and South Dakota,
0.62). The fact that the unit root null cannot be rejected in the majority of the states
is not surprising given the wide intervals resulting from the small sample size. By
contrast, the semiparametric estimates (Robinson 1995a) provide more evidence of
fractional cointegration: in five states (Connecticut, Ohio, South Dakota, Vermont
and Wisconsin), this hold for all three bandwidth parameters, and in a large num-
ber of states (including Delaware, Idaho, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maine,
Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Caroline, Oregon,
South Caroline, South Dakota, Tennessee), there is at least one case of fractional
cointegration.
Finally, Table 9 shows the results of the Hausman test for no cointegration of
Marinucci and Robinson (2001) which compares the estimates of dx and dy (for
healthcare expenditure and disposable income)with those obtained using the estimated
residuals, all of them based on the semiparametric Whittle approach of Robinson










where m < [T/2] is again a bandwidth parameter; d̂i are the univariate estimates of dx
and dy , d̂∗ is an estimate obtained from the residuals of the cointegrating regression.
Using this approach, we find evidence of fractional cointegration in the following
cases: Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, New York,
Nevada, North Caroline, Tennessee and Vermont. Cointegration does not appear to
hold in the remaining states.
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Table 8 Estimates of d for each state and homogeneity in the value of d
State β1 (t value) Parametric Semiparametric
d (T)0.4 (T)0.5 (T )0.6
Alabama 2.248 (57.63) 0.91 (0.68, 1.30) 0.825 0.751 0.876
Alaska 2.578 (6.71) 1.29 (1.05, 1.69) 0.987 0.997 1.234
Arizona 2.104 (28.50) 1.18 (0.87, 1.68) 0.650 0.742 0.969
Arkansas 2.316 (39.18) 0.87 (0.65, 1.23) 0.945 0.801 0.858
California 2.193 (31.63) 1.17 (0.89, 1.51) 1.054 1.290 1.314
Colorado 1.699 (36.32) 1.27 (0.94, 1.75) 1.262 0.942 1.166
Connecticut 2.115 (56.58) 0.83 (0.52, 1.34) 0.318 0.500 0.694
Delaware 2.942 (43.46) 0.92 (0.61, 1.27) 0.500 0.394 0.995
Florida 2.353 (41.98) 0.92 (0.66, 1.38) 0.260 0.714 0.691
Georgia 2.109 (44.59) 1.06 (0.79, 1.45) 0.939 1.043 1.130
Hawaii 2.807 (25.04) 1.08 (0.86, 1.37) 1.500 1.232 0.981
Idaho 2.734 (29.55) 0.80 (0.59, 1.10) 0.777 1.088 0.712
Illinois 2.431 (42.91) 0.83 (0.54, 1.19) 0.300 1.088 0.712
Indiana 2.845 (39.22) 0.65 (0.37, 1.07) 0.237 0.424 1.015
Kansas 2.378 (35.05) 0.90 (0.68, 1.20) 0.606 0.809 1.049
Kentucky 2.674 (41.19) 0.92 (0.72, 1.21) 1.219 1.018 0.949
Louisiana 2.275 (29.43) 1.24 (1.04, 1.65) 1.397 1.493 1.174
Maine 2.530 (53.09) 0.96 (0.67, 1.33) 0.445 0.558 0.931
Maryland 2.110 (54.09) 1.07 (0.79, 1.41) 0.500 0.558 0.931
Massachusetts 1.889 (46.55) 1.21 (0.96, 1.52) 1.054 1.242 1.392
Michigan 2.858 (26.93) 1.11 (0.73, 1.62) 0.946 0.921 0.834
Minnesota 2.150 (42.37) 0.68 (0.45, 1.04) 0.634 0.418 0.545
Mississippi 2.469 (51.60) 0.90 (0.69, 1.20) 1.100 1.165 0.849
Missouri 2.434 (48.23) 0.63 (0.42, 0.96) 0.853 0.418 0.686
Montana 2.790 (21.40) 0.88 (0.73, 1.09) 1.058 1.103 1.111
New Hampshire 2.115 (44.46) 0.96 (0.74, 1.25) 0.868 1.205 1.062
New Jersey 2.404 (54.05) 0.90 (0.64, 1.26) 0.138 0.610 0.881
New Mexico 2.609 (32.92) 1.09 (0.89, 1.43) 1.500 1.003 1.166
New York 2.372 (42.96) 0.90 (0.64, 1.28) 0.316 0.545 0.949
Nevada 2.582 (24.18) 1.03 (0.71, 1.54) 0.672 0.724 1.045
N. Carolina 2.311 (62.88) 1.03 (0.67, 1.53) −0.045 0.371 0.776
Ohio 2.985 (44.27) 0.92 (0.51, 1.54) 0.142 0.280 0.378
Oklahoma 2.345 (34.78) 0.92 (0.77, 1.14) 1.488 1.273 1.257
Oregon 2.457 (39.17) 1.07 (0.73, 1.55) 0.595 0.708 0.931
Pennsylvania 2.615 (48.95) 0.95 (0.73, 1.27) 0.698 0.892 0.937
Rhode Island 2.332 (46.91) 1.07 (0.82, 1.47) 1.066 1.067 0.910
S. Carolina 2.547 (61.36) 1.03 (0.74, 1.43) −0.054 0.835 0.842
S. Dakota 2.130 (24.45) 0.62 (0.44, 0.80) 0.609 0.662 0.672
Tennessee 2.118 (56.09) 0.91 (0.63, 1.42) 0.810 0.632 0.702
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Table 8 continued
State β1 (t value) Parametric Semiparametric
d (T)0.4 (T)0.5 (T )0.6
Texas 2.090 (38.28) 0.95 (0.74, 1.36) 1.117 0.925 1.121
Utah 2.450 (28.32) 1.44 (0.99, 2.21) 0.658 0.718 1.056
Vermont 2.268 (54.46) 0.84 (0.56, 1.23) 0.542 0.529 0.695
Virginia 2.050 (73.63) 0.95 (0.67, 1.40) 0.313 0.987 0.789
W. Virginia 2.894 (36.53) 1.00 (0.79, 1.30) 1.260 0.842 0.970
Washington 2.162 (41.95) 0.94 (0.68, 1.35) 0.641 1.228 1.101
Wisconsin 2.598 (54.22) 0.88 (0.57, 1.33) 0.552 0.576 0.640
Wyoming 2.077 (13.35) 1.16 (0.99, 1.40) 1.462 1.500 1.361
The 2nd column displays the estimated of β1 (and their t values) in Eq. (4) with I(d) xt . The 3rd column
displays the estimates of d using the parametric approach, while the values in columns 4, 5 and 6 refers to
the estimates of d with a semiparametric method. The confidence bands for the I(1) hypothesis are (0.632,
1.367), (0.689, 1.310) and (0.739, 1.269), respectively, for T 0.4, T 0.5 and T 0.6
Finally, we run OLS regressions in first differences of log healthcare expenditure on
log-disposable income to shed light on the short-run incomeelasticities. The estimation
results are displayed in Table 10.2
In 40 states, the estimated elasticities are statistically significant and positive, rang-
ing from 0.107 (Nebraska) to 0.752 (Georgia); in the remaining ten states (Alaska,
Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Oklahoma, West Virginia, Washington and Wyoming),
the null of a zero slope coefficient cannot be rejected. For three states (Alabama,
Georgia and South Caroline), the null of an elasticity equal to 1 cannot be rejected
at the 5% level. In brief, the evidence points to an income elasticity lower than one
in most US states, which implies that health is a normal (rather than a luxury) good.
Table 11 reports the estimated long-run and short-run income elasticities for health-
care expenditure in each of the 50 US states, showing in which of the states health
care can be considered a luxury (Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Indiana,
Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Nevada, North Caroline, South Caroline,
Tennessee and Vermont) or a necessity good (the rest of the states). If health care
is a luxury good, demand will increase more rapidly than income, and public health
policies can only have a subsidiary role. However, if it is a necessity good, more redis-
tribution of healthcare resources and greater public involvement in health care might
be needed. That is, the size of the income elasticity offers key information on the
optimal level of health expenditure and on the potential role of public health policies
in providing health care.
2 At this stage, it is important to point out that the short-run and the long-run elasticities displayed,
respectively, in Tables 8 and 10 refer to two different models. Note that the β1-coefficients presented
in Table 8 refer to those based on the long-run relationship, while those in Table 10 refer to the slope
and the intercept in the first differenced model. In the fractional cointegration context, we can build up a
fractional VECMmodel as the one suggested in Johansen and Nielsen (2010, 2012), but under some strong
assumptions, that are not incorporated in the present work. This is a possible direction in which our work
could be extended in the future.
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Table 9 Estimates of d and tests of no cointegration against fractional cointegration
States dx (HCE) dy (DPI) d (Resid.) Hox Hoy
Alabama 1.207 0.866 0.751 10.520 0.669
Alaska 1.161 1.090 0.997 1.360 0.437
Arizona 1.432 0.813 0.742 24.088 0.255
Arkansas 1.361 0.850 0.801 15.867 0.121
California 1.500 1.069 1.190 4.862 0.740
Colorado 1.097 1.102 0.942 1.215 0.182
Connecticut 1.400 0.898 0.500 40.983 8.014
Delaware 1.065 1.286 0.394 22.780 40.257
Florida 1.427 0.857 0.714 25.721 1.034
Georgia 1.500 1.096 1.043 10.576 1.034
Hawaii 1.298 1.500 1.232 2.231 0.142
Idaho 1.070 1.500 1.088 0.016 8.586
Illinois 1.161 0.887 0.819 xxx xxx
Indiana 1.015 0.649 0.424 17.672 5.344
Kansas 0.917 0.823 0.809 0.590 0.099
Kentucky 1.194 0.905 1.018 1.567 0.646
Louisiana 1.415 1.286 1.193 2.493 0.437
Maine 0.862 0.935 0.558 4.675 7.191
Maryland 1.500 1.061 0.558 44.897 12.801
Massachusetts 1.448 1.168 1.242 8.340 0.803
Michigan 1.340 0.995 0.921 8.882 0.277
Minnesota 1.279 0.680 0.418 37.508 3.473
Mississippi 1.205 1.241 1.165 0.080 0.292
Missouri 1.153 0.670 0.418 27.333 3.213
Montana 1.037 1.111 1.103 0.220 0.032
New Hampshire 1.314 1.344 1.205 0.601 0.977
New Jersey 1.477 0.917 0.610 38.032 4.768
New Mexico 0.855 0.864 0.803 0.136 0.188
New York 1.450 0.980 0.545 41.439 9.574
Nevada 1.411 1.036 0.724 54.725 22.375
N. Carolina 1.371 1.048 0.371 50.596 23.189
Ohio 1.189 0.500 0.280 41.806 2.448
Oklahoma 1.331 1.318 1.273 0.170 0.102
Oregon 1.183 0.908 0.708 11.415 2.023
Pennsylvania 1.374 0.942 0.892 11.745 0.126
Rhode Island 1.017 1.069 1.067 0.126 0.020
S. Carolina 1.175 1.069 0.835 5.848 2.770
S. Dakota 0.645 0.801 0.662 xxx xxx
Tennessee 1.346 0.933 0.632 25.793 4.584
Texas 1.347 0.975 0.925 9.010 0.126
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Table 9 continued
States dx (HCE) dy (DPI) d (Resid.) Hox Hoy
Utah 0.954 0.984 0.718 2.818 3.580
Vermont 1.271 0.890 0.529 27.856 6.593
Virginia 1.247 1.267 0.987 3.420 3.966
W. Virginia 1.180 0.848 0.842 5.780 0.001
Washington 1.003 0.804 0.808 1.923 0.001
Wisconsin 1.500 0.711 0.576 43.198 0.922
Wyoming 1.290 1.306 1.100 1.826 2.147
The values in the 2nd and 3rd columns refer to the estimated values of d for the two individual series;
the following column refers to the estimate of d for the residuals; finally, the last two columns refers to
the test statistics for Hx and Hy, respectively, using the Hausman test of Marinucci and Robinson (2001).
χ21 (5%) = 3.84. In bold are those cases where we reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the 5%
level
Table 10 Regression based on
first differences
State Intercept Slope
Alabama 0.029 (5.57) 0.713 (3.80)a
Alaska 0.042 (7.63) 0.018 (0.14)
Arizona 0.028 (5.94) 0.415 (2.61)
Arkansas 0.038 (9.00) 0.284 (2.24)
California 0.025 (5.96) 0.516 (2.74)
Colorado 0.029 (7.35) 0.122 (0.79)
Connecticut 0.030 (6.74) 0.509 (3.39)
Delaware 0.036 (10.83) 0.413 (3.08)
Florida 0.033 (7.67) 0.444 (3.14)
Georgia 0.026 (5.81) 0.752 (4.72)a
Hawaii 0.034 (7.08) 0.162 (0.89)
Idaho 0.036 (5.98) 0.218 (1.08)
Illinois 0.031 (10.71) 0.278 (2.70)
Indiana 0.035 (9.27) 0.351 (2.72)
Iowa 0.036 (9.44) 0.138 (1.49)
Kansas 0.034 (7.80) 0.245 (1.60)
Kentucky 0.037 (9.77) 0.358 (2.72)
Louisiana 0.035 (7.03) 0.419 (2.39)
Maine 0.038 (9.04) 0.428 (2.78)
Maryland 0.030 (6.80) 0.579 (3.67)
Massachusetts 0.029 (6.90) 0.550 (3.75)
Michigan 0.033 (11.65) 0.282 (2.74)
Minnesota 0.034 (8.69) 0.220 (1.87)
Mississippi 0.037 (7.10) 0.596 (3.62)
Missouri 0.032 (8.19) 0.414 (2.90)
Montana 0.035 (8.11) 0.308 (2.31)
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Table 10 continued State Intercept Slope
Nebraska 0.036 (10.56) 0.206 (2.31)
New Hampshire 0.036 (9.18) 0.356 (2.87)
New Jersey 0.032 (7.09) 0.492 (2.90)
New Mexico 0.035 (7.11) 0.449 (2.32)
New York 0.031 (8.30) 0.365 (2.56)
Nevada 0.028 (6.21) 0.534 (3.27)
N. Carolina 0.031 (7.64) 0.687 (4.87)
N. Dakota 0.038 (8.00) 0.107 (1.91)
Ohio 0.035 (9.34) 0.342 (2.12)
Oklahoma 0.036 (8.04) 0.123 (0.83)
Oregon 0.031 (7.93) 0.440 (2.81)
Pennsylvania 0.033 (8.33) 0.462 (2.69)
Rhode Island 0.030 (7.90) 0.571 (3.72)
S. Carolina 0.034 (7.15) 0.665 (3.80)a
S. Dakota 0.039 (11.40) 0.122 (2.05)
Tennessee 0.029 (6.73) 0.600 (4.06)
Texas 0.033 (8.38) 0.247 (1.74)
Utah 0.033 (7.86) 0.259 (1.79)
Vermont 0.033 (6.87) 0.391 (2.30)
Virginia 0.029 (6.68) 0.648 (4.08)
W. Virginia 0.040 (8.91) 0.278 (1.61)
Washington 0.032 (7.78) 0.212 (1.23)
Wisconsin 0.031 (8.36) 0.570 (3.58)
Wyoming 0.039 (6.69) −0.075 (−0.50)
The 2nd column refers to the
intercept and the third to the
slope for the OLS regression
based on first differences of long
healthcare expenditures on log-
disposable income. t values in
parenthesis
a We cannot reject the null of a
slope coefficient equal to 1 at the
5% level
4 Conclusions
This paper examines the relationship between healthcare expenditure and disposable
income in the US states over the period 1966–2009 using fractional integration and
cointegration techniques. First, we estimate the fractional order of integration for each
of the two series in each of the US states and find that it is equal or higher than 1
for healthcare expenditure in all states and for disposable income in most of them
(except Iowa, Nebraska, North Dakota and South Dakota), which suggests that these
two variables are non-stationary. These findings are confirmed when nonlinearities are
introduced into the model.
Second, we test for fractional cointegration between healthcare expenditure and
disposable income using various methods. The results change depending on whether
a parametric or a semiparametric approach is followed. Specifically, the null of no
cointegration cannot be rejected in the former case except for Missouri and South
Dakota, while there is stronger evidence of cointegration in the latter case: when using
the Hausman test for no cointegration of Marinucci and Robinson (2001), fractional
123
G. M. Caporale et al.
Table 11 Long-run and
short-run elasticities
State Long-run Short-run Luxury/
necessity
Alabama 0.713 (3.80)a Luxury
Alaska 0.018 (0.14)
Arizona 0.415 (2.61) Necessity
Arkansas 0.284 (2.24) Necessity
California 0.516 (2.74) Necessity
Colorado 0.122 (0.79)
Connecticut 2.115 (56.58) 0.509 (3.39) Luxury
Delaware 2.942 (43.46) 0.413 (3.08) Luxury
Florida 0.444 (3.14) Necessity
Georgia 0.752 (4.72)a Luxury
Hawaii 0.162 (0.89) Necessity
IDAHO 0.218 (1.08) Necessity
Illinois 0.278 (2.70) Necessity
Indiana 2.845 (39.22) 0.351 (2.72) Luxury
Iowa 0.138 (1.49)
Kansas 0.245 (1.60)
Kentucky 0.358 (2.72) Necessity
Louisiana 0.419 (2.39) Necessity
Maine 2.110 (54.09) 0.428 (2.78) Luxury
Maryland 1.889 (46.55) 0.579 (3.67) Luxury
Massachusetts 0.550 (3.75) Necessity
Michigan 0.282 (2.74) Necessity
Minnesota 0.220 (1.87) Necessity
Mississippi 0.596 (3.62) Necessity
Missouri 0.414 (2.90) Necessity
Montana 0.308 (2.31) Necessity
Nebraska 0.206 (2.31) Necessity
New Hampshire 0.356 (2.87) Necessity
New Jersey 2.372 (42.96) 0.492 (2.90) Luxury
New Mexico 0.449 (2.32) Necessity
New York 2.311 (62.88) 0.365 (2.56) Luxury
Nevada 2.985 (44.27) 0.534 (3.27) Luxury
N. Carolina 2.345 (34.78) 0.687 (4.87) Luxury
N. Dakota 0.107 (1.91) Necessity
Ohio 0.342 (2.12) Necessity
Oklahoma 0.123 (0.83) Necessity
Oregon 0.440 (2.81) Necessity
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Table 11 continued State Long-run Short-run Luxury/
necessity
Pennsylvania 0.462 (2.69) Necessity
Rhode Island 0.571 (3.72) Necessity
S. Carolina 0.665 (3.80)a Luxury
S. Dakota 0.122 (2.05) Necessity
Tennessee 2.268 (54.46) 0.600 (4.06) Luxury
Texas 0.247 (1.74) Necessity
Utah 0.259 (1.79) Necessity
Vermont 2.162 (41.95) 0.391 (2.30) Luxury
Virginia 0.648 (4.08) Necessity
W. Virginia 0.278 (1.61)
Washington 0.212 (1.23)
Wisconsin 0.570 (3.58) Necessity
Wyoming −0.075 (−0.50)
Column 2 shows the long-run
income elasticities for those
states in which a cointegration
relationship exists, and column 3
shows the short-run income elas-
ticities, based on the regression in
first differences. t values in paren-
thesis
a We cannot reject the null of a
slope coefficient equal to 1 at the
5% level. The last column shows
whether health is a luxury or a
necessity good in each of the US
states on the basis of the
estimated long-run and short-run
income elasticities
cointegration is found in 11 US states (Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, Maine, Mary-
land, New Jersey, New York, Nevada, North Caroline, Tennessee and Vermont).
Finally, in the US states for which cointegration holds, the income elasticity is in all
cases above 1, which suggests that health care is a luxury rather than a necessity good.
Elsewhere, the lack of cointegration implies that factors other than disposable income
drive healthcare expenditure, and therefore, health care is instead a necessity good. As
for the short-run elasticities from the regressions in first differences, in most cases they
are estimated to lie in the interval (0, 1), being significantly positive in 40 states, while
in only three states (Alabama, Georgia and South Caroline) the null hypothesis of an
income elasticity equal to one cannot be rejected. The implication is that in most US
states health care is a necessary good, which requires more redistribution of resources
and more active health policies.
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